International Relations scholars viewed the unipolar moment–the period of time from 1989 to approximately 2014 when the U.S. was the unrivaled superpower–through the lens of Constructivism and Liberalism. As Waheeda Rana (2015) said in her 2015 essay on Complex Interdependence Theory, the stable political order of the post-Cold War era replaced the previous national security dominated one. Economic development and technology advancements replaced concerns of war and nuclear incineration. Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man predicted the death of liberal democracy, the end of realism, and the ascendance of liberalism. Some pundits believed his work suggested an end to state conflict. Liberal and Constructivist scholars were euphoric. The end of the Cold War, UN and NATO interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrated the nature of security had changed. Security was redefined by UN Development Program of 1994 which gave us the term Human Security (Breslin and Christou 2015).
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As a doctoral student in Global Security, I have found the schools of international relations–Realism, Constructivism, and Liberalism–to be unliberated. Scholars explain their views of the world according to the school of international relations they subscribe to. Yet, examining the shift that occurred in 2014 through 2022, it is clear to see we have transitioned from an era of liberalism to an era of realism. History can as easily be understood in patterns that conform with realism and liberalism.
If you would take a short historical journey with me, I will explain. But first off, what is realism? Realism is a system that focuses on the nation state. It holds that nations are governed by fear, interest, and power because the international order is anarchical. Liberalism on the other hand is system focused on the international regimes and institutions (Waheeda 2015). It rejects power politics and subscribes to international cooperation (2015). In International Relations literature, these two schools of thought define the international order is a divergent manner. Each interprets it based on both theory and events. And it is events, geopolitical events in particular, that order the march of history. And when I speak of history, I am specifically speaking to western history, owing to its political and philosophical advancements. I choose to define history in patterns that subscribe to realism and liberalism. What do I mean. Broadly, the modern era beginning in the late 1800s saw the Franco-Prussian War and the emergence of balance of power politics in Europe. This era, up until the end of World War I was governed by realism–interests, fear, and power. At the end of carnage and devastation of World War I the world subscribed to liberalism, with the League of Nations being the catalyst. This era continued into the 1920s but was supplanted by national socialism and Bolshevism. Realism once again governed international affairs, but at the end of World War II, nations again subscribed to liberalism in the form of the United Nations until the Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949. The Cold War was governed by realism as we said before till 1989, till the collapse of the USSR. But now, the unipolar moment has ended with a return to realism.
What we can say about each of the periods of war is that they resulted in mankind retreating behind fear, interest, and power until their enemies were defeated, and/or national exhaustion ensued. We can also say that the periods of adherence to liberal principles was brief compared to the periods of history governed by realism. When liberalism was given a chance, it was usually because exhaustion dictated to a willingness to give peace a chance. In 2014, Putin’s invasion of Crimea arguably ended the unipolar moment and the end of a period governed by liberalism. Today, competition and conflict dominate the globe. Revisionist states are squared off against the West.
So why is this all important anyway. Who cares? The reason is international relations (IR) and political science is understood through the prism of history. History, our story, is what dictates world events. Too often in my reading of scholar IR literature, I got the impression that scholars, activists, and pundits believe their ideology can dictate our understanding and the evolution of world affairs. Rather, I believe events, such as Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, ushered in this new era. Of course, we have free will and agency to dictate the events of history, but all too often fear, and interest dictate action. Certainly, it could also be said that liberalism is perceived as threat to revisionist powers. Putin famously said to a gathering of other heads of state and government, “My halls of power, like yours, remain firm in their rejection of imposed liberal democracy” (Fish 2017, 64-65). It would be safe to say that Putin did not wake up one day and decide to invade Ukraine. No, this has been a process that began when NATO deployed to Kosovo, and was exacerbated in 2008 at the NATO Summit when Georgia and Ukraine were promised a path to NATO membership. Other event, like Putin’s Munich Conference speech, his invasion of Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and finally the annexation of Crimea. The same is true of China. Michael Pillsbury, imminent Chinese scholar, speaking about China’s strategy of hiding its hegemonic ambition in plain sight stated, “Beijing has a sophisticated system in place to mislead foreigners about what is going on in their country and reconfirm Western biases and wishful thinking (Pillsbury 2015, 115). The shroud of their deception is now off, but China’s revisionist ambitions are historical in nature. Xi often colors his narrative with powerful images like 100-years of shame and rejuvenation. In other words, humiliation will be avenged, and Putin uses similar language.
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History, and arguably foreign affairs and national security matters, not schools of international relations thought, are the hidden hands of world events. I choose to evaluate what is happening in the world not only by some school of thought, but by the long march of history. Neither schools of thought nor values and norms are able to change the nature of man. Liberalism has a place in international affairs, it gives us a goal to strive toward, but we have to acknowledge fear, interest, and power govern Interational Affairs.
Breslin, Shaun, and George Christou. 2015. “Has the Human Security Agenda Come of Age? Definitions, Discourses and Debates.” Contemporary Politics 21 (1): 1–10.
Fish, M. Steven. 2017. “The Kremlin Emboldened: What Is Putinism?” Journal of Democracy 28 (4): 61–75.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Pillsbury, Michael. 2015. “The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower.” New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
Waheeda, Rana. 2015. “Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal Thoughts.” International Journal of Business and Science, 6 (2): 290-297.
O. Kent Strader is currently a 2d year doctoral student of Global Security at American Military University. He is a retired Army Colonel and former Army Strategist. He currently works for a major defense consulting firm. None of the views expressed in this post represent any corporation or the US military. They are the solely the views of the author.